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The following contributions are hereby worked: one mathematically formalises Mundell’s Impossible
trio and Rodrik’s Globalisation paradox, supplying the latter with a taxonomy in terms of the current
account; by means of Kaldor’s price endogeneity in output, one proves that external real money market
disparity and trade generate external output mismatches and lead to autarky unless offset, using
topology and dynamical systems; one characterises transfers and federalism and shows that all unitary
states are federal polities and can merge into confederations; one demonstrates that the said external
output mismatches can be only eluded via autarky or neutralisation, irrespective of federalism; one
discerns artificial currency areas guaranteeing inter-regional external output growth equality and modern
protectionism as two Nash equilibria, especially rationalising the nexus between the Gold standard, the
Industrial revolution and the Great divergence therethrough.
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1.1 International trilemmas. In this article one studies two famous international macroeconomics
trilemmas: Robert Mundell’s [9] Impossible trio and Dani Rodrik’s [13] Globalisation paradox. Mundell’s
trilemma stipulates that out of fixed exchange rates, financial openness and monetary policy independence
at most two can be selected. Rodrik’s trilemma spells that out of the nation state, deep economic integration
and democratic politics at most two can be achieved.
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Mundell’s trilemma is an established tenet of international macroeconomics and it rewarded Mundell
with a Nobel prize; Rodrik’s is not and is considered heterodox. To one’s mind, such is so for two reasons:
Mundell’s trilemma was diagrammatically presented and it concerns the capital account; Rodrik’s trilemma
is still verbal and it concerns the current account. Formal reasoning is ever superior to informal reasoning,
for it fleshes out relations, and diagrams are thereby better than words. Current account dynamics are the
true divide of economics, between protectionists and advocates of free trade: business cycle stabilisation
and wealth redistribution are orthodox tenets, all in all, and they treat the closed economy; protectionism
treats the open one and it is outrage.
1.2 Contributions. One herewith mathematically formalises both trilemmas and through their
resulting interaction one shows that Rodrik’s trilemma didactically outshines that of Mundell, managing to
coherently explain (i) autarkic mercantilism, (ii) the Gold standard, the Industrial revolution and the Great
divergence and (iii) globalisation. One’s contributions are therefore at once methodological and notional.
Via Nicholas Kaldor’s [4] price endogeneity in output, one firstly shows that the nation state and deep
economic integration permanently implode: one does so both by means of topology and through a stylised
dynamical system, whereby one calculates parametric conditions for instability. One then defines federalism
and establishes that regions always feature it internally and by choice even externally. One thirdly proves
that said implosion is avoidable through either autarky or neutralisation, regardless of federalism. Finally,
one (historically) intersects both trilemmas’ combinations through game theory and presents two Nash
equilibria.
2. Capital account: Impossible trio
2.1 Real and nominal variables. Foreign variables are identified by means of an asterisk superscript;
whenever foreign variables be not defined the characterisations of their domestic counterparts are assumed
to apply to them and whenever they may be defined as specular to domestic variables it is to be for clarity
purposes. All variables except domestic and foreign nominal money supply MS and M
∗
S and domestic and
foreign nominal exchange rate E and E∗ are economically real, that is, they are nominal variables divided
by price: x = X
p
, ∀X ∈ R and p ∈ R\{0}; economically real variables admit supply dynamics on the part
of firms and government via prices p (i.e. capital, labour, technology, subsidies, taxation); one employs the
adjectives “nominal” and “real” whenever clarity may be at risk.
2.2 Output and money market. The adjectives “external” and “internal” respectively relate to the
open and closed economy, in turn connected to tradable and non-tradable commodities. Domestic and
foreign output x and x∗, domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D and domestic and foreign prices
p and p∗ are external and, for simplicity, unless clarity may otherwise warrant, one does not employ such
an adjective: they would be otherwise denoted as xE , x
∗
E , mED, m
∗
ED, pE and p
∗
E , respectively.
Under a single currency domestic and foreign nominal money supply MS and M
∗
S are internal and
external; under a double currency they are subdivided into domestic and foreign internal currency MI and
M∗I and domestic and foreign external currency ME and M
∗
E : internal currency is the currency circulating
within a region’s borders (i.e. those of a political region or nation); external currency is the currency
circulating on the foreign exchange market.
Domestic real money supply mS is defined as domestic nominal money supply MS over domestic prices
p : mS =
MS
p
. Foreign real money supply m∗S is defined as foreign nominal money supply M
∗
S over foreign
prices p∗ : m∗S =
M∗S
p∗
. Both are external and should be respectively denoted as mES and m
∗
ES , but, for
simplicity, one likewise avoids the adjective.
2.3 Prices and money demand. Domestic prices p increase in domestic autonomous wages aw,
domestic autonomous capital return ark, domestic supply taxation tS , changed domestic nominal money
supply ṀS , changed domestic autonomous output supply ȧsx, changed domestic autonomous long run
supply ȧsL, changed domestic output demand ḋx and they decrease in domestic autonomous output
supply asx (i.e. external technology), domestic autonomous long run supply asL (i.e. external and
internal technology), changed domestic autonomous wages ˙aw, changed domestic autonomous capi-




























ṫD). All variables are external, domestic
autonomous long run supply asL included, being both external and internal: the adjective is again avoided.
Domestic autonomous prices ap group domestic autonomous wages aw, domestic autonomous capital
return ark, domestic autonomous output supply asx, domestic autonomous long run supply asL and
domestic supply taxation tS ; changed domestic autonomous prices ȧp group changed domestic autonomous
wages ˙aw, changed domestic autonomous capital return ˙ark, changed domestic autonomous output supply
ȧsx, changed domestic autonomous long run supply ȧsL and changed domestic supply taxation ṫS ; changed
domestic autonomous money demand ˙amD groups changed domestic output demand ḋx and changed
domestic demand taxation ṫD. Domestic prices p can be thus re-expressed according to the said collections,
increasing in domestic autonomous prices ap, changed domestic nominal money supply ṀS and changed










Domestic money demand mD increases in domestic autonomous output supply asx, domestic autonomous
long run supply asL and domestic output demand dx and it decreases in domestic autonomous wages
aw, domestic autonomous capital return ark, domestic supply taxation tS and domestic demand taxation














tD). Domestic money demand mD increases in domestic
autonomous output supply asx and domestic autonomous long run supply asL because increments therein
are assumed to be permanent, decreasing domestic prices p and thereby increasing domestic money demand
mD. Correspondingly, permanent increments in domestic autonomous wages aw, domestic autonomous
capital return ark and domestic supply taxation tS increase domestic prices p and thereby decrease domestic
money demand mD.
Domestic autonomous money demand amD obviously groups domestic output demand dx and domestic
demand taxation tD; domestic money demand mD can be thus re-expressed as increasing in domestic





Domestic output demand dx increases in domestic autonomous output demand adx (i.e. protectionistic
consumption) and foreign autonomous output demand ad∗x and it decreases in foreign tariffs tf







tf∗). Domestic supply and demand taxation tD and tS respectively increase in domestic
autonomous supply and demand taxation atS and atD and they respectively decrease in domestic supply








sD). All variables are again external
and the adjective is eluded anew.
2.4 Fiscal depreciations. Domestic supply taxation tS is the instrument through which fiscal
depreciations arise. In detail, fiscal depreciations are effected by decreasing domestic supply taxation tS on
domestic output x, which decreases domestic prices p and thereby domestic real interest rate r, in turn
increasing domestic real exchange rate e (see subsection 2.6); fiscal appreciations are effected accordingly.
The decrease in domestic supply taxation tS on domestic output x to the end of a fiscal depreciation
also increases domestic money demand mD, for domestic output x, consequently, if the fiscal depreciation is
aimed at offsetting a prevenient decrease in domestic output x, domestic demand taxation tD on domestic
output x must be increased in order to neutralise the excess increase in domestic output x otherwise
generated.
In the absence of domestic savings sv fiscal depreciation is financed by decreasing domestic structural
spending gS .
2.5 Monetary fiscality. Domestic structural spending gS is normally financed through domestic
income and savings taxation T, but monetary fiscality seems more efficient, namely, domestic lump sum
taxation T on domestic nominal money supply MS : tax evasion would be reduced to consumption taxation
(i.e. domestic autonomous demand taxation atD and domestic autonomous closed taxation atC), which








adS), external and internal.
Monetary fiscality in proportion to projected category use would hardly be feasible inasmuch as the
categories benefiting from the services provided by the specific domestic structural spending gS may hardly
afford their prospected usage thereof.
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In short, monetary fiscality would have the advantage of eliminating domestic income tax evasion and
minimising domestic savings sv accumulation abroad.
2.6 Exchange rates. Domestic nominal exchange rate E is an increasing function of domestic
nominal money supply MS and of foreign money demand m
∗
D and a decreasing function of foreign









real exchange rate e is an increasing function of domestic real money supply mS and of foreign money
demand m∗D and a decreasing function of foreign real money supply m
∗
S and of domestic money demand









Foreign nominal exchange rate E∗ is an increasing function of foreign nominal money supply M∗S and
of domestic money demand mD and a decreasing function of domestic nominal money supply MS and of









m∗D). Foreign real exchange rate e
∗ is an increasing
function of foreign real money supply m∗S and of domestic money demand mD and a decreasing function of












Strictly speaking, domestic nominal exchange rate E is domestic real exchange rate e multiplied by
domestic prices p and domestic real exchange rate e is an increasing function of foreign real interest rate
r∗ and of domestic expected real interest rate er and a decreasing function of domestic real interest rate








er∗). In turn, domestic
real interest rate r is an increasing function of domestic money demand mD and a decreasing function of
domestic real money supply mS ; comparably, domestic expected real interest rate er is a decreasing function




mS); er = f(
−
r).
Analogous definitions ultimately apply to foreign nominal exchange rate E∗, foreign real exchange rate
e∗, foreign real interest rate r∗ and foreign expected real interest rate er∗. For simplicity, such deeper
definitions are eschewed.
2.7 Fixations and floatations. For constant foreign nominal money supply M∗S and foreign money
demand m∗D, domestic nominal exchange rate E fixations and managed floats (or crawling pegs) are
respectively arbitrary and semi-arbitrary changes in domestic nominal money supply MS and domestic
money demand mD, matching a predetermined value (i.e. real, metallic, monetary). For constant foreign
real money supply m∗S and foreign money demand m
∗
D, domestic real exchange rate e fixations and managed
floats (or crawling pegs) are respectively arbitrary and semi-arbitrary changes in domestic real money supply
mS and domestic money demand mD, matching a predetermined value (i.e. real, metallic, monetary).
Domestic nominal exchange rate E floatations or free floats are non-arbitrary changes in domestic
nominal money supply MS and domestic money demand mD, irrespective of foreign nominal money supply
M∗S and foreign money demand m
∗
D. Domestic real exchange rate e floatations or free floats are non-arbitrary
changes in domestic real money supply mS and domestic money demand mD, irrespective of foreign real
money supply m∗S and foreign money demand m
∗
D.
Definition 2.8 (Rigidity, openness and independence) Let X and Y be respective subsets of the
real hyperplane and let their elements be growth rates: X =
{
x ∈ Rn : x = ẋl
xl
}
, ∀n ≥ 1, and Y =
{
y ∈ R : y = ẏl
yl
}
, wherein subscript l signifies levels. Let f be a real, twice continuously differentiable
function: f : X → Y and f ∈ C2.
1. Rigidity is the fixed equality of the domestic real exchange rate to a number within a non-negative
real interval. 2. Openness is the increase of the domestic real exchange rate in the domestic real money
supply and in foreign money demand and the decrease of the domestic real exchange rate in the foreign real
money supply and in domestic money demand. 3. Independence is the variable equality of the domestic
nominal money supply to a non-negative real number. Formally:
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1. R : e = ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+ (rigidity);









3. I : MS ∈ R+ (independence).
One works in growth rates, rather than levels, because one wishes to eventually model full employment
domestic output x levels despite level disparities in domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S
and in domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D (see section 3).
2.9 Rigidity and flexibility. Rigidity R means that domestic real exchange rate e is fixed to value ẽ
in some non-negative real interval [e, e] : under rigidity R domestic real exchange rate e equals a specific
non-negative real value ẽ. Such models Mundell’s fixed exchange rates, whereby domestic and foreign real
money supply mS and m
∗
S and domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D are constant.








mD) = e ∈ R+ such that
domestic real exchange rate e (with domestic nominal exchange rate E thereby) floats in the non-negative
real number line R+; indeed, domestic real exchange rate e must be a function of domestic and foreign real
money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D and domestic nominal
exchange rate E must be a function of domestic and foreign nominal money supply MS and M
∗
S and of
domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D, otherwise both would in effect be arbitrarily fixed to a
non-negative real number, contradictorily tracing rigidity R.
Specifically, flexibility F is not the fixed equality of domestic real exchange rate e to a number within a
non-negative real interval: e 6= ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+.
2.10 Mundell’s exchange rates. In more detail, Mundell’s fixed exchange rates can be defined as
fixations in domestic nominal exchange rate E or, more broadly, in domestic real exchange rate e. In the
case of fixed domestic real exchange rate e one’s above definition of rigidity R models Mundell’s fixed
exchange rates by tracing domestic real money supply mS and domestic money demand mD fixations.
In the case of fixed domestic nominal exchange rate E movements in domestic and foreign prices p and
p∗ are not by definition considered, therefore, one’s above characterisation of rigidity R models Mundell’s
fixed exchange rates as well, meeting domestic nominal money supply MS and domestic money demand
mD fixations and residually leaving domestic and foreign prices p and p
∗ unvaried.
Correspondingly, Mundell’s floating exchange rates would be modelled as flexibility F, also defined
above, whereby domestic real exchange rate e (with nominal exchange rate E thereby) is allowed to float in
the non-negative real number line R+.
2.11 Openness and closure. Openness O means that domestic real exchange rate e increases in
domestic real money supply mS and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and that it decreases in foreign real
money supply m∗S and in domestic money demand mD. Such models Mundell’s financial openness (i.e.
capital account convertibility).








mD) such that domestic
real exchange rate e is not a function of domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S and of
domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D. Closure implies that domestic nominal exchange rate E
is not a function of domestic and foreign nominal money supply MS and M
∗
S and of domestic and foreign
money demand mD and m
∗









Under closure C foreign real exchange rate e∗ is likewise not a function of foreign and domestic real money
supply m∗S and mS and of foreign and domestic money demand m
∗










Such implies that foreign nominal exchange rate E∗ is not a function of foreign and domestic nominal money
supply M∗S and MS and of foreign and domestic money demand m
∗










Under closure C domestic nominal money supply MS cannot be exchanged for any other currency and
can thus be priced only relative to other domestic assets.
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2.12 Single and double currency. Under openness O there is a single currency; under closure C
there is either a single or a double currency. Under closure C and a single currency there is rigidity R,
because if flexibility F were present then domestic real exchange rate e would be a function of domestic and
foreign real money supply mS and m
∗




Under closure C and a double currency domestic non-negative real external currency ME ∈ R+, on
the foreign exchange market or not, is either permanently retained for imports (exchanged for foreign
non-negative real external currency M∗E ∈ R+ or foreign nominal money supply M
∗
S therefor) or eventually




2.13 Independence and dependence. Independence I means that domestic nominal money supply
MS floats in the non-negative real number line R+ : under independence I domestic nominal money
supply MS equals any non-negative real number. Specifically, independence I is not the fixed equality
of domestic nominal money MS supply to a non-negative real number: MS 6= M̃ ∈ R+. Such models
Mundell’s monetary policy independence.




⊂ R+ such that





2.14 Currency substitution. Domestic real exchange rate e and domestic nominal money supply
MS are non-negative because they admit reduction to zero, the latter being purchased through foreign
currency or reserves at a given rate in currency substitution (e.g. dollarisation).
Both under openness O and closure C and a single currency domestic nominal money supply MS is
substituted for foreign nominal money supply M∗S or foreign external currency M
∗





Under closure C and a double currency only domestic external currency ME is substituted, for foreign
nominal money supply M∗S or foreign external currency M
∗





2.15 Monetary and foreign exchange policy. Under independence I the real non-negative value of
domestic nominal money supply MS is ideally determined by anti-cyclical monetary policy (i.e. neutralisation
of internal temporary supply shocks and, sub-optimally, also of demand).
Under rigidity and openness R ∧O non-negative real interval [e, e] specified for domestic real exchange
rate e is determined by foreign exchange policy (i.e. managed floats or crawling pegs) such that there exists
a compromise between monetary policy and foreign exchange policy; thus, under openness O monetary
policy is fully enjoyed only through independence and flexibility I ∧ F.
One stresses that non-negative real interval [e, e] models managed floats and crawling pegs and that








mD) = e ∈ R+
(i.e. predetermined and random). Consequently, under rigidity and independence R ∧ I domestic nominal
money supply MS ’s real non-negative value is determined by monetary policy; non-negative real interval
[e, e] is by contrast thereby absent under a foreign exchange policy of fixation and respectively present
under one of managed floatation.
Proposition 2.16 (Impossible trio) Rigidity, openness and independence cannot be simultaneously
selected: rigidity and openness imply dependence; rigidity and independence imply closure; openness and
independence imply flexibility. Formally:
1. R ∧O −→ D (s.q.n. dependence);
2. R ∧ I −→ C (s.q.n. closure);
3. O ∧ I −→ F (s.q.n. flexibility).
Proof. Lemma 2.16.1 (s.q.n. dependence; direct) Rigidity R means that e = ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+ and








mD); therefore, mS , m
∗
S , mD and m
∗
D are constant and













D ⊢MS = M̃ ∈ R+. Thus, R ∧O −→ D.
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mD); rigidity R means that e = ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+, therefore, mS , m
∗
S , mD and
m∗D are constant and MS = M̃ ∈ R+ specifically, contradicting independence I, which means that








mD) and e = ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+ ⊢ mS = m̃S , mD = m̃D, m̄
∗
S and








mD). Thus, R ∧ I −→ C.
Lemma 2.16.3 (s.q.n. flexibility; contradiction) Assume rigidity R, which means that e = ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+;








mD), therefore, mS , m
∗
S , mD and m
∗
D are constant and
MS = M̃ ∈ R+ specifically, contradicting independence I, which means that MS 6= M̃ ∈ R+ : e = ẽ ∈












D ⊢ MS = M̃ ∈ R+, but
MS 6= M̃ ∈ R+ ⊢ e 6= ẽ ∈ [e, e] ⊂ R+. Thus, O ∧ I −→ F. QED
Out of rigidity R, openness O and independence I at most two can be selected. Rigidity and openness
R ∧O mean that domestic real exchange rate e is fixed to non-negative real value ẽ, that it is a function
of domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and foreign money demand mD
and m∗D and that domestic nominal money supply MS is thus fixed to value M̃, not floating and violating
independence I : rigidity and openness R ∧O are sufficient for dependence D.
Rigidity and independence R ∧ I mean that if openness O were active then domestic real exchange
rate e would be a function of domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and
foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D, that it would be fixed to non-negative real value ẽ and that domestic
nominal money supply MS would thus be fixed to value M̃, not floating and violating independence I,
being a contradiction: rigidity and independence R ∧ I are sufficient for closure C.
Openness and independence O ∧ I mean that if rigidity R were active then domestic real exchange rate
e would be fixed to non-negative real value ẽ, that it would be a function of domestic and foreign real
money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D and that domestic
nominal money supply MS would thus be fixed to value M̃, not floating and violating independence I,
being a contradiction: openness and independence O ∧ I are sufficient for flexibility F.
2.17 Capital account combinations. More predicate calculus can reveal that of eight capital account
combinations (i.e. of rigidity R, openness O and independence I) the feasible ones are the following.
Beforehand, one remarks that OMOs is the acronym of open market operations, whereby a region’s
central bank conducts monetary or foreign exchange policy on the bourse, through government or corporate
bonds, foreign reserves or other securities. The case of decree fixation is abbreviated to decree and it is such
that balance of payments transactions necessarily pass by the central bank. Currency duality (i.e. single or
double currency) is also specified, together with the corresponding orientation (i.e. fixation or floatation)
and the attendant mode of realisation (i.e. OMOs, decree or sole domestic money demand and prices):
1. O ∧D ∧R [single currency, fixed (OMOs)];
2. O ∧ I ∧ F [single currency, floating (OMOs)];
3. C ∧ I ∧R [single currency, floating (OMOs)-fixed (decree);
double currency, floating (OMOs)-fixed (decree or OMOs)];
4. O ∧D ∧ F [single currency, floating (sole domestic money demand and prices)];
5. C ∧D ∧ F [double currency, fixed (decree or OMOs)-floating (OMOs)];
6. C ∧ I ∧ F [double currency, floating (OMOs)-floating (OMOs)];
7. C ∧D ∧R [single currency, fixed (decree or OMOs)-fixed (decree);
double currency, fixed (decree or OMOs)-fixed (decree or OMOs)];
the infeasible combination is R ∧ O ∧ I, as seen above. The three converses of the Impossible trio
are additionally disproven thereby: D −→ R ∧ O = ¬(D ∧ F ∨ C), admitting D ∧ F ∧ C, D ∧ F ∧ O
and D ∧ R ∧ C, which are all true, whence D 6−→ R ∧ O; C −→ R ∧ I = ¬(C ∧ F ∨ D), admitting
C ∧F ∧D, C ∧F ∧ I and C ∧R∧D, which are all true, whence C 6−→ R∧ I; F −→ O∧ I = ¬(F ∧C ∨D),
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admitting F ∧ C ∧D, F ∧ C ∧ I and F ∧O ∧D, which are all true, whence F 6−→ O ∧ I.
2.18 Actual cases. The first three mark actual cases. Openness, dependence and rigidity O ∧D ∧R
present a single, fixed currency, enacted via OMOs. Examples are customary fixed exchange rates, managed
floats or crawling pegs, currency unions (e.g. European monetary system, European monetary union, African
financial community), currency boards (e.g. 1990s Argentina dollarisation) and currency substitutions (e.g.
contemporary Panama and Ecuador dollarisation).
Openness, independence and flexibility O ∧ I ∧ F present a single, floating currency, whereby monetary
policy is enacted via OMOs (i.e. foreign exchange policy is absent). Examples are customary floating
exchange rates and reserve currency acquisitions (i.e. accumulation).
Closure, independence and rigidity C ∧ I ∧ R present either a single or a double currency, floating
internally and fixed externally in both events: under a single currency internal floatation is enacted via
OMOs and external fixation is enacted via decree; under a double currency internal floatation is enacted
via OMOs and external fixation is enacted either via decree or via OMOs. A single currency example is
early the 2000s Chinese Yuan Renminbi in relation to the American Dollar.
2.19 Other cases. Openness, dependence and flexibility O ∧D ∧ F present a single, floating currency,
whereby changes in domestic real exchange rate e take place only through changes in domestic money
demand mD and domestic prices p (i.e. besides monetary policy, foreign exchange policy is additionally
absent).
Closure, dependence and flexibility C ∧ D ∧ F present a double currency, internally fixed, enacted
via decree or OMOs, and externally floating, enacted via OMOs; the combination is such that changes
in domestic real exchange rate e take place only through changes in domestic money demand mD and
domestic prices p (i.e. besides monetary policy, foreign exchange policy is additionally absent).
Closure, independence and flexibility C ∧ I ∧ F present a double currency, internally and externally
floating, enacted via OMOs; the combination is such that changes in domestic real exchange rate e take
place only through changes in domestic money demand mD and domestic prices p (i.e. foreign exchange
policy is absent).
Closure, dependence and rigidity C ∧D ∧R present either a single or a double currency, internally and
externally fixed: under a single currency internal fixation is enacted either via decree or via OMOs and
external fixation is enacted via decree; under a double currency internal and external fixations are enacted
either via decree or via OMOs. The combination is such that monetary policy is absent.
2.20 Great divergence. A historic instance of openness, rigidity and dependence O ∧R ∧D is the
Gold standard. The United kingdom adopted the Gold standard in 1821, the Second industrial revolution
occurred in the United kingdom around 1870 and the Great divergence of the West followed thereafter.
Mundell’s trilemma cannot explain such a concomitance because it does not contemplate the impact of the
nominal money supply, of prices and of money demand on external output; Rodrik’s trilemma can.
3. Current account: Globalisation paradox
Definition 3.1 (Sovereignty, trade and efficiency) Let X and Y be respective subsets of the real hyper-
plane and let their elements be growth rates: X =
{
x ∈ Rn : x = ẋl
xl
}
, ∀n ≥ 1, and Y =
{




wherein subscript l signifies levels. Let f be a real, twice continuously differentiable function: f : X → Y
and f ∈ C2.
1. Sovereignty is the inequality between the domestic and foreign real money supply or between domestic
and foreign money demand. 2. Trade is the increase of domestic output in the domestic real money supply
and in domestic money demand and the decrease of domestic output in the foreign real money supply and
in foreign money demand. 3. Efficiency is the equality of domestic output to foreign output. Formally:
1. S : mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D (sovereignty);









3. E : x = x∗ (efficiency).
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3.2 Sovereignty and subjection. Sovereignty S means that domestic real money supply mS does
not equal foreign real money supply m∗S or that domestic money demand mD does not equal foreign money
demand m∗D : under sovereignty S domestic real money supply mS does not correspond to foreign real
money supply m∗S or domestic money demand mD does not correspond to foreign money demand m
∗
D.
Such models Rodrik’s nation state: it is called sovereignty because a region allows domestic real money
supply mS or domestic money demand mD not to equal the others’; sovereignty S in terms of price or
money demand disparity would especially reflect the institutional differences discussed by Rodrik (i.e.
through firms and government).
The inequality between domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S or between domestic
and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D is such that the disjunction is inclusive, namely, there can be a
simultaneous inequality in the real money supplies and money demands, however, it is such that the effects
on domestic and foreign output x and x∗ do not neutralise each other: mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D is such that (i)
mS 6= m
∗
S , (ii) mD 6= m
∗
D or (iii) mS 6= m
∗
S and mD 6= m
∗












6= −x∗mS, D (because xmS − xmD 6= 0, xm∗S − xm∗D 6=
0, xmS, D + xm∗S, D 6= 0 and vice versa).
Subjection SB is non-sovereignty ¬S and it can be written as mS, D = m
∗
S, D such that domestic real
money supply mS equals foreign real money supply m
∗
S and such that domestic money demand mD equals
foreign money demand m∗D : ¬(mS 6= m
∗
S ∨mD 6= m
∗
D) = (mS = m
∗
S ∧mD = m
∗
D).
3.3 Trade and autarky. Trade T means that domestic output x increases in domestic real money
supply mS and in domestic money demand mD and that it decreases in foreign real money supply m
∗
S and
in foreign money demand m∗D. Trade T in terms of foreign output x
∗ means that it increases in foreign real
money supply m∗S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and that it decreases in domestic real money supply










Such models Rodrik’s deep economic integration. Under subjection SB a change in domestic real money
supply mS or domestic money demand mD can be offset by (reciprocal) opposing changes therein or by a
change in foreign real money supply m∗S or foreign money demand m
∗
D from abroad and vice versa.

















mD) such that domestic output x and foreign output x
∗ are not functions of
domestic real money supply mS and domestic money demand mD and of foreign real money supply m
∗
S
and foreign money demand m∗D. Specifically, domestic output x and foreign output x
∗ are zero because the
external output sector disappears: x = x∗ = 0.
3.4 Efficiency and inefficiency. Efficiency E means that domestic output x equals foreign output
x∗ : under efficiency E domestic output x corresponds to foreign output x∗.
Such models Rodrik’s democratic politics: it is called efficiency E because a region maintains full
employment or at least symmetric unemployment (envisaged in growth rates).
Inefficiency I is non-efficiency ¬E and it can be written as x 6= x∗ such that domestic output x does
not equal foreign output x∗.
3.5 Exports and imports. The reason for which domestic output x decreases in foreign real money
supply m∗S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D is that changes therein increase foreign output x
∗, foreign
exports ex∗ and therefore domestic imports im, also decreasing domestic exports ex, and vice versa. Indeed,
domestic output x is also the difference between domestic exports ex and domestic imports im, valued at




















im∗ −→ x∗ = ex∗ − e∗ · im∗.
Such is so because of the following, whereby all variables are domestic. Demand D is the sum of
private consumption c, public consumption g (i.e. government spending) and firm consumption i (i.e.
investment); supply S is the sum of non-tradable (i.e. internal) output yNT R and tradable output yT R,
which is in turn the sum of output x and imports im, weighted at real exchange rate e, net of exports
ex : D ≡ c + i + g = yNT R + yT R = yNT R + (x + e · im − ex) ≡ S. Since demand D and non-tradable
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output yNT R hereby equal zero (i.e. there is no internal economy) external output x is derived to equal
said difference: D = yNT R = 0 −→ x = ex− e · im.
In more detail, domestic exports ex increase in domestic real money supply mS and in domestic money
demand mD and decrease in foreign real money supply m
∗
S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and foreign
exports ex∗ increase in foreign real money supply m∗S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and decrease in


















Likewise, domestic imports im decrease in domestic real money supply mS and in domestic money
demand mD and increase in foreign real money supply m
∗
S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and foreign
imports im∗ decrease in foreign real money supply m∗S and in foreign money demand m
∗
D and increase in


















3.6 Marshall Lerner conditions. The increase of domestic output x in domestic real money
supply mS is the satisfaction of a Marshall Lerner condition applied to equation x = ex− e · im and its
variables’ respective functions, dictating an increase in domestic output x given an increase in domestic
real money supply mS if and only if the sum of domestic export elasticity ηex and of the modulus
elasticity of domestic imports ηim net of the elasticity of the domestic real exchange rate ηe is positive:






(emS im+e·immS ) = ηex−ηe−ηim, since ex = e·im at equilibrium, thus, xmS > 0←→ ηex−ηe−ηim > 0
and since ηim < 0, domestic imports im being demand in domestic real money supply mS , |ηim| = −ηim;
for completeness, ηex, etae > 0, domestic exports ex and domestic real exchange rate e being supply
in domestic real money supply mS . Analogously, a decrease in domestic output x given an increase in
foreign real money supply m∗S takes place if and only if the sum of domestic export elasticity ηex and of
the modulus elasticity of the domestic real exchange rate ηe net of the elasticity of domestic imports ηim
is negative: xm∗
S
< 0 ←→ ηex + |ηe| − ηim < 0, since ηim > 0 and ηex, ηe < 0 such that |ηe| = −ηe (i.e.
domestic imports im are supply in foreign real money supply m∗S and domestic exports ex and domestic
real exchange rate e are demand in foreign real money supply m∗S).
The increase of domestic output x in domestic money demand mD is the satisfaction of another Marshall
Lerner condition applied to equation x = ex− e · im and its variables’ respective functions, dictating an
increase in domestic output x given an increase in domestic money demand mD if and only if the sum of
domestic export elasticity ηex, of the modulus elasticity of the domestic real exchange rate ηe and of the
modulus elasticity of domestic imports ηim is positive: xmD > 0←→ ηex + |ηe|+ |ηim| > 0; more specifically,






(emD im + e · immD ) = ηex − ηe − ηim, since
ex = e · im at equilibrium, thus, xmD > 0 ←→ ηex − ηe − ηim > 0 and since ηe, ηim < 0, domestic real
exchange rate e and domestic imports im being demand in domestic money demand mD, |ηe| = −ηe and
|ηim| = −ηim; for completeness, ηex > 0 domestic exports ex being supply in domestic money demand mD.
Analogously, a decrease in domestic output x given an increase in foreign money demand m∗D takes place if
and only if domestic export elasticity ηex net of the elasticity of the domestic real exchange rate ηe and
of the elasticity of domestic imports ηim is negative: xm∗
D
< 0←→ ηex − ηe − ηim < 0, since ηex < 0 and
ηim, ηe > 0 (i.e. domestic exports ex are demand in foreign money demand m
∗
D and domestic imports im
and domestic real exchange rate e are supply in foreign money demand m∗D).
Proposition 3.7 (Globalisation paradox) Sovereignty, trade and efficiency cannot be simultaneously
selected: sovereignty and trade imply inefficiency; sovereignty and efficiency imply autarky; trade and
efficiency imply subjection. Formally:
1. S ∧ T −→ I (s.q.n. inefficiency);
2. S ∧ E −→ A (s.q.n. autarky);
3. T ∧ E −→ SB (s.q.n. subjection).
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Proof. Lemma 3.7.1 (s.q.n inefficiency; direct) Sovereignty S means that mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D and trade

















mD), therefore, x and x
∗ are
unequal: mS, D 6= m
∗




























mD) ⊢ x 6= x
∗. Thus,
S ∧ T −→ I.


















mD); sovereignty S means that mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D, therefore,

















mD); mS, D 6= m
∗












6= −x∗mS, D ⊢ x 6= x


















mD) such that x = x
∗ = 0. Thus, S ∧ E −→ A.
Lemma 3.7.3 (s.q.n. subjection; contradiction) Assume sovereignty S, which means that mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D;

















mD), therefore, x and
x∗ are unequal, contradicting efficiency E, which means that x = x∗ : mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D such that





























mD) ⊢ x 6= x
∗, but x = x∗ ⊢ mS, D = m
∗
S, D. Thus,
T ∧ E −→ SB. QED
Out of sovereignty S, trade T and efficiency E at most two can be selected. Sovereignty and trade S ∧T
mean that domestic real money supply mS does not equal foreign real money supply m
∗
S or that domestic
money demand mD does not equal foreign money demand m
∗
D, whereby the effects on domestic and foreign
output x and x∗ do not neutralise each other, that domestic and foreign output x and x∗ are functions of
domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and foreign money demand mD and
m∗D and that domestic output x does not thus equal foreign output x
∗ : sovereignty and trade S ∧ T are
sufficient for inefficiency I.
Sovereignty and efficiency S ∧ E mean that if trade T were active then domestic and foreign output
x and x∗ would be functions of domestic and foreign real money supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic
and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D, that domestic real money supply mS would not equal foreign
real money supply m∗S or that domestic money demand mD would not equal foreign money demand m
∗
D,
whereby the effects on domestic and foreign output x and x∗ would not neutralise each other, and that
domestic output x would not thus equal foreign output x∗ : sovereignty and efficiency S ∧ E are sufficient
for autarky A.
Trade and efficiency T ∧E mean that if sovereignty S were active then domestic real money supply mS
would not equal foreign real money supply m∗S or domestic money demand mD would not equal foreign
money demand m∗D, whereby the effects on domestic and foreign output x and x
∗ would not neutralise each
other, that domestic and foreign output x and x∗ would be functions of domestic and foreign real money
supply mS and m
∗
S and of domestic and foreign money demand mD and m
∗
D and that domestic output x
would not thus equal foreign output x∗ : trade and efficiency T ∧ E are sufficient for subjection SB.
3.8 Current account combinations. More predicate calculus can reveal that of eight current account
combinations (i.e. of sovereignty S, trade T and efficiency E) the feasible ones are the following:
1. S ∧A ∧ E (efficient sovereign autarky);
2. S ∧ T ∧ I (inefficient sovereign trade);
3. SB ∧ T ∧ E (efficient subjected trade);
4. SB ∧A ∧ E (efficient subjected autarky);
the infeasible combinations are S ∧ T ∧E (efficient sovereign trade), as seen above, S ∧A∧ I (inefficient
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sovereign autarky), SB ∧ T ∧ I (inefficient subjected trade) and SB ∧A ∧ I (inefficient subjected autarky).
Combinations S∧A∧I and SB∧A∧I are infeasible because autarky A and inefficiency I are contradictory,
inter-regional output equalling zero by the definition of autarky A and thereby meeting the definition of
efficiency E : (i) mS, D 6= m
∗
S, D, (ii) mS, D = m
∗
S, D and x = x
∗ = 0 ⊢ x = x∗. Combination SB ∧ T ∧ I
is infeasible because under trade T subjection SB preserves inter-regional real money supply and money
demand equality, thereby meeting the definition of efficiency E : mS, D = m
∗

















mD) ⊢ x = x
∗.
The first converse of the Globalisation paradox is additionally proven thereby: I −→ S ∧ T =
¬(I ∧SB ∨A), admitting I ∧SB ∧A, I ∧SB ∧T and I ∧S ∧A, which are all false. The last two converses
of the Globalisation paradox are similarly disproven thereby: A −→ S ∧ E = ¬(A ∧ SB ∨ I), admitting
A∧SB ∧ I, A∧S ∧ I and A∧SB ∧E, which is true, thus, A 6−→ S ∧E; SB −→ T ∧E = ¬(SB ∧A∨ I),
admitting SB ∧A ∧ I, SB ∧ T ∧ I and SB ∧A ∧ E, which is true, thus, SB 6−→ T ∧ E.
Proposition 3.9 (Sovereignty and trade implosion) Let domestic and foreign output be a real sequence:
{x, x∗} ⊂ R. Assume the existence of a non-negative lower bound on inter-regional output at which autarky
happens: x, x∗ > x̃ ≥ 0 : A. Sovereignty and trade imply that the sequence of output converges to the
output lower bound. Formally:
S ∧ T −→ lim
mS, D→∞
x∗mS, D = x̃.
Proof. By sovereignty S domestic real money supply mS or domestic money demand mD can respectively
exceed foreign real money supply m∗S or foreign money demand m
∗
D and by trade T domestic output
x can consequently exceed foreign output x∗ : mS, D > m
∗


















mD) ⊢ x > x
∗. More clearly, a change in domestic output x given a change in domestic real
money supply mS or domestic money demand mD is positive and a change in foreign output x
∗ given a change




Thus, for some large enough domestic real money supply mS or domestic money demand mD foreign output
x∗ is arbitrarily close to output lower bound x̃ : ||x∗mS, D− x̃|| < ||xmS, D− x̃|| = ε > 0, ∃mS, D = m̄ ∈ R++.




Domestic output x and foreign output x∗ form a real sequence. There also exists a non-negative output
lower bound at which autarky A happens, x̃. Sovereignty and trade S ∧ T mean that domestic real money
supply mS or domestic money demand mD can be respectively greater than foreign real money supply
m∗S or foreign money demand m
∗
D, that domestic output x and foreign output x
∗ respectively increase
and decrease therein, that domestic output x can thus be greater than foreign output x∗ and that, for
some large enough domestic real money supply mS or domestic money demand mD, the normed distance
between foreign output x∗ and output lower bound x̃ is therefore arbitrarily small, that is, the normed
distance between foreign output x∗ and output lower bound x̃ is therefore smaller than the normed distance





Given a change in foreign real money supply m∗S or foreign money demand m
∗
D the proposition can be
alternatively formulated in terms of domestic output x diminution and foreign output x∗ augmentation.
Under autarky A domestic output x and foreign output x∗ equal zero, but output lower bound x̃, at
which autarky A happens, does not have to be zero because the implosion caused by sovereignty and trade
S ∧ T can curtail trade T before, discretionally. Indeed, trade T is necessarily curtailed (i.e. output lower
bound x̃, whereat autarky A occurs, is attained to) once domestic capital k, labour l and savings sv have
been depleted and foreign credit is no longer available: w, rk = f(
−
ẋ, . . .) and sv = f(
−
ẋ∗, . . .) such that
0 = f(0, . . .) (see subsection 3.11 for price endogeneity in output).
3.10 Money market and prices. Under trade T an increment in domestic output x is caused by
an increment in domestic real money supply mS or in domestic money demand mD : the increment in
nominal real money supply MS or the decrement in domestic prices p increases domestic real money supply
mS , decreases domestic real interest rate r, increases domestic capital k demand and increases domestic
12
output x; the increment in domestic money demand mD increases domestic labour l demand and increases
domestic output x.
However, the respective increments in demand for domestic capital k and for domestic labour l increase
domestic prices p, decrease domestic real money supply mS and decrease domestic output x. The initial
decrement in domestic prices p happens through a decrement in domestic autonomous prices ap and the
initial increment in domestic money demand mD happens through an increment in domestic autonomous
money demand amD. A permanent decrement in domestic autonomous prices ap also increases domestic
money demand mD, increases demand for domestic labour l (which increases domestic prices p, decreases
domestic real money supply mS and decreases domestic output x) and increases domestic output x.
Domestic prices p therefore increase in domestic autonomous prices ap, changed domestic nominal money
supply ṀS and changed domestic autonomous money demand ˙amD and they decrease in changed domestic








ȧp). Domestic money demand mD correspondingly
increases in domestic autonomous money demand amD and it decreases in domestic autonomous prices ap,





If domestic prices p adjust actively (i.e. they are flexible) then domestic output x does not change,
save for temporary and permanent changes in domestic autonomous prices ap : xmS mSMS + xppṀS = 0
and xmD mDamD + xpp ˙amD = 0 (i.e. demand shocks, to the nominal money supply and money demand,
temporary or permanent); xppap + xppȧp < 0 and xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp < 0 (i.e. supply shock,
to prices, temporary and permanent). If domestic prices p adjust sluggishly (i.e. they are rigid) then
domestic output x changes: xmS mSMS + xppṀS > 0 and xmD mDamD + xpp ˙amD > 0 (i.e. demand shocks,
to the nominal money supply and money demand, temporary or permanent, to which supply eventually
adjusts); xppap + xppȧp < 0 and xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp < 0 (i.e. supply shock, to prices, temporary and
permanent). Clearly, in the face of both rigid and flexible adjustments in domestic prices p a permanent
change in domestic autonomous prices ap ultimately generates a lower domestic output x than a temporary
change in domestic autonomous prices ap : (xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp) < (xppap + xppȧp) < 0.
3.11 Endogenous prices. Be that as it may, the insight of the Gold standard, the Second industrial
revolution and the Great divergence is that domestic output x increases permanently: Kaldor conjectured
that such might happen through domestic prices p endogeneity in domestic output x, that is, in domestic
supply s (i.e. technology) or domestic wages w : domestic productivity increases or foreign labour l∗ supply
immigrates into domestic labour l supply (i.e. galvanisation or immigration; see Verdoorn [18] and Thirlwall
[16] for the first).
Regardless of whether one work in growth rates or levels, under non-linearity endogeneity of domestic
prices p in domestic output x can determine increasing inter-regional output growth differences and under
linearity it can determine constant inter-regional output growth differences: the condition for such an
instability under non-linearity is the decrease and convexity of domestic prices p in changed domestic
output ẋ and under linearity it is the decrease of domestic prices p in changed domestic output ẋ. Thus,
in order for domestic output x to continue growing domestic prices p must additionally be a decreasing











under linearity convexity is preserved, although unnecessarily, since a linear function is both convex and
concave.
Irrespective of the curvature in inter-regional output growth (i.e. increasing or constant), endogeneity of
domestic prices p in domestic output x driven by domestic supply s or domestic wages w determines bilateral
inter-regional output growth differences. Unilateral ones would be displayed by endogeneity of domestic
prices p in domestic output x driven by domestic supply s in the absence of domestic real money supply
mS and domestic money demand mD effects on foreign output x
∗ and vice versa; endogeneity of domestic
prices p in domestic output x driven by domestic wages w would nonetheless still determine bilateral
inter-regional output growth differences, for the inter-regional labour supply would yet be redistributed.
Indeed, if the decrease of domestic prices p in changed domestic output ẋ, through domestic wages w, is
exceeded by the negative increase of foreign prices p∗ in changed foreign output ẋ∗, through foreign wages
w∗, then, as part of the foreign labour l∗ force relocates domestically, part of the inter-regional labour
supply is diluted, modelling structural unemployment: pẋ < −p
∗
ẋ∗ ; cyclical unemployment by contrast
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concerns internal output dynamics.
Domestic prices p endogeneity in domestic output x thus causes permanent increments in domestic
output x through temporary and permanent changes in domestic nominal money supply MS and domestic
autonomous money demand amD in the face of sluggish domestic prices p and through temporary and
permanent changes in domestic autonomous prices ap in the face of sluggish and active domestic prices
p : xMS +xppṀS +xppẋ > 0 and xmD mDamD +xpp ˙amD +xppẋ > 0 (i.e. demand shocks, to the nominal money
supply and money demand, temporary or permanent, under sluggish prices); xppap + xppȧp + xppẋ < 0 (i.e.
temporary supply shock, to prices, under sluggish and active prices); xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp + xppẋ < 0
(i.e. permanent supply shock, to prices, under sluggish and active prices).
3.12 Neutralisation. Neutralisation is the equality between a change in cumulative domestic output
x given a change in domestic nominal money supply MS and a change in domestic output x given (i) a
change in domestic autonomous money demand amD or (ii) a negative change in domestic autonomous
prices ap : xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = xmD mDamD or xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = −xppap. Indeed, neutralisation
is a situation of trade and efficiency T ∧ E and therefore of subjection SB; in more detail, (i) the change
in domestic autonomous prices ap offsets that in domestic nominal money supply MS and thereby leaves
domestic real money supply mS unchanged and equal to foreign real money supply m
∗
S , inter-regional
money demand remaining constant, fulfilling subjection SB, (ii) the change in domestic autonomous money
demand amD offsets that in domestic nominal money supply MS and thereby violates sovereignty S in
that the effects of domestic real money supply mS and domestic money demand mD on domestic output x
neutralise each other: (i) xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = −xppap such that mS = m
∗
S , provided m̄D = m̄
∗
D; (ii)
xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = xmD mDamD .
An offsetting change in domestic autonomous money demand amD resembles autarky A because it
would be caused by an offsetting change in domestic output demand dx or domestic demand taxation tD :
domestic autonomous output demand adx, foreign autonomous output demand ad
∗
x or domestic supply or
demand subsidy sS or sD would increase or domestic autonomous supply or demand taxation atS or atD
or foreign tariffs tf∗ would decrease, nevertheless, trade T would still be in theoretical place.
Sovereignty and trade S ∧ T imply inefficiency I, thus, trade and efficiency T ∧ E can thence be
achieved (if and) only if the total change in domestic output x given a change in domestic nominal money
supply MS , that is, the change in domestic output x passing through domestic prices p readjustment and
endogeneity, is offset by a negative change in domestic autonomous money demand amD or a change in
domestic autonomous prices ap. In the face of trade T an opposite change in domestic nominal money
supply MS would neutralise inefficiency I through subjection SB, for domestic real money supply mS
would then again equal foreign real money supply m∗S , all else equal, thus, trade and efficiency T ∧E would
lack sovereignty S. In detail, domestic prices p readjustment and endogeneity would be reduced to zero:
xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = xMS ←→ xppṀS + xppẋ = 0.
Neutralisation can also be defined such that the initial change in domestic output x is driven, not
by domestic nominal money supply MS , but by domestic autonomous prices ap or domestic autonomous
money demand amD and offset accordingly.
4. Inefficiency model
4.1 Dynamical system. One now models a permanent augmentation in domestic output x through a
dynamical system for which one determines an instability condition (with regard to domestic output x).
The dynamical system is a six equation model of the above functions: the first equation is for domestic
output x, which omits foreign real money supply m∗S and foreign money demand m
∗
D, studying sole domestic
shocks; the second equation is for domestic money demand mD; the third equation is for domestic prices
p; the fourth, fifth and sixth are for domestic nominal money supply MS , domestic autonomous money
demand amD and domestic autonomous prices ap. It is the following:
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x = αxMS − βxp + γxmD (domestic output);
mD = αmD amD − βmD ap (domestic money demand);
p = αpap + βpṀS + γp ˙amD − δpȧp− ǫpẋ (domestic prices);
ṀS = σMS εMS (domestic nominal money supply);
˙amD = σamD εamD (domestic autonomous money demand);
ȧp = µap + σapεap (domestic autonomous prices),
where domestic prices arithmetic mean µap models the drift of the mnemonic process (i.e. random walk)
of domestic prices p and where generic white noise ε ∼ N (0, σ2), that is, normally distributed with a mean
of zero and a finite variance, models the shock of the mnemonic process.
4.2 Parametrisation. The usage of growth rates in relation to endogenous variables allows to treat
parameters as elasticity measures.
Generic parameter set {α, β, γ, δ} = Θ ⊂ R+. In the first equation the sum of parameters αx, βx
and γx amounts to one. In the second equation the sum of parameters αmD and βmD exceeds one. In the
third equation the sum of parameters αp, βp, γp and δp exceeds one; parameter ǫp ∈ (1, ∞), modelling
domestic prices p decrease and convexity (which is linearly irrelevant) in domestic output x. The first
equation’s parametrisation is coherently based on a constant elasticity of substitution function of imperfect
complements (i.e. Cobb Douglas), that is, equally weighting money demand and supply and the nominal
money supply and prices therein; the parametrisation of the second and of the third equation arises from the
parametric restrictions proceeding from the treated economic theory (see subsections 3.10-12) in conjunction
with the parametrisation of the first equation.
4.3 Inefficiency. The present dynamical system can be consequently termed an inefficiency model.
The inefficiency model tautologically features trade T in the non-zero modelling of domestic output x and
it features sovereignty S in view of the exogenous shocks to domestic nominal money supply MS , domestic
autonomous money demand amD or domestic autonomous prices ap. The inefficiency model additionally
features rigidity R, because it models domestic nominal money supply MS as a mnemonic process, as
opposed to an amnesic one (i.e. autoregressive process of order one), whereof managed floats or crawling
pegs would be examples (flexibility F would instead feature an amnesic process absent an effected shock);
it does not speak to openness O and independence I because it does not model the internal sector.
Since domestic nominal money supply MS , domestic autonomous money demand amD and domestic
autonomous prices ap are exogenous and one does not momentarily carry out policy analysis, that is, one
only determines a condition for instability at present, one can omit the last three equations; one can then
substitute the equations for domestic money demand mD and for domestic prices p in the equation for
domestic output x, solve the homogeneous differential equation for domestic output x, by finding the roots
and by treating the rest of the equation as the heterogeneous component, and determine the instability
condition for domestic output x, by noting that the eigenvalues are the inverse of the roots:
x = αxMS − βx[αpap + βpṀS + γp ˙amD − δpȧp− ǫpẋ] + γx[αmD amD − βmD ap] =
= βxǫpẋ + κ (domestic output heterogeneous differential equation)
−→ x = βxǫpẋ (homogeneous component)
−→ ezt − zβxǫpe









i=1 ⊂ C. In continuous time, t ∈ R, the condition for instability in domestic output x is
λ = βxǫp > 0. Since data are discrete the dynamical system and the condition for instability in domestic
output x can be contemplated in discrete time, t ∈ Z, where endogenous variables v 7→ vt and changed
endogenous variables v̇ 7→ vt−1, where variance weighted white noise processes become vt = σvεvt and
where the mnemonic process with drift becomes vt = µv + vt−1 + σvεvt : |λ| = βxǫp > 1. Consequently,
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because parameter βx ∈ [0, 1] (by the Cobb Douglas parametrisation) one notes the following restrictions:
if βx = 0 then
1
βx
is a contradiction and if βx = 1 then ǫp >
1
βx
= 1, thus, βx ∈ (0, 1] and ǫp ∈ (1, ∞).
Cumulative domestic output x changes given changes in domestic nominal money supply MS , domestic
autonomous money demand mD and autonomous prices ap determine the following parametric restrictions:
xMS +xppṀS +xppẋ = αx−βxβp +βxǫp > 0 and xmD mDamD +xpp ˙amD +xppẋ = γxαmD −βxγp +βxǫp > 0
(i.e. demand shocks, to the nominal money supply and money demand, temporary or permanent, under
sluggish prices); xppap + xppȧp + xppẋ = −βxαp + βxδp + βxǫp < 0 (i.e. temporary supply shock, to prices,
under sluggish and active prices); xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp + xppẋ = −βxαp − γxβmD + βxδp + βxǫp < 0
(i.e. permanent supply shock, to prices, under sluggish and active prices). Neutralisation determines
the ulterior parametric restriction xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = αx − βxβp + βxǫp = xmD mDamD = γxαmD or
xMS + xppṀS + xppẋ = αx − βxβp + βxǫp = −xppap = βxαp.
4.4 Parameters. In the first equation domestic nominal money supply elasticity of domestic output αx
and domestic price elasticity of domestic output βx both equal 0.25 and domestic money demand elasticity
of domestic output γx equals 0.5. In the second equation domestic autonomous money demand elasticity of
domestic money demand αmD and domestic autonomous price elasticity of domestic money demand βmD
both equal 2.0025. In the third equation domestic autonomous price elasticity of domestic prices αp equals
4.01, changed domestic nominal money supply elasticity of domestic prices βp equals 1, changed domestic
autonomous money demand elasticity of domestic prices γp equals 4.005; changed domestic autonomous
price elasticity of domestic prices δp equals 8.0149 and changed domestic output elasticity of domestic
prices ǫp equals 4.01. In the sixth equation drift µap equals 0.005, quarterly tracing a two per cent annual
technology growth rate (i.e. 0.005 · 4 = 0.02); in the last three equations white noise standard deviations σ
equal 0.01, suggesting a one per cent quarterly standard deviation shock.
The first equation’s parametrisation assigns equal shares to domestic real money supply mS and
domestic money demand mD and to domestic nominal money supply MS and domestic prices p within
domestic real money supply mS . Changed domestic output elasticity of domestic prices ǫp equals 4.01




= 4. All other parameters are calculated on account of trade
and efficiency T ∧ E, relying on the notions of readjustment and neutralisation via the above parametric
restrictions. Changed domestic nominal money supply elasticity of domestic prices βp is thus derived
from the readjustment condition xMS + xppṀS = αx − βxβp = 0.25− 0.25βp = 0. Domestic autonomous
money demand elasticity of domestic money demand αmD is derived from the neutralisation condition
xMS +xppṀS +xppẋ−xmD mDamD = αx−βxβp+βxǫp−γxαmD = 0.25+0.25(4.01−1)−0.5αmD = 0. Domestic
autonomous price elasticity of domestic money demand βmD is set in symmetry to domestic autonomous
money demand elasticity of domestic money demand αmD . Domestic autonomous price elasticity of domestic
prices αp is derived from the neutralisation condition xMS +xppṀS +xppẋ+xppap = αx−βxβp+βxǫp−βxαp =
0.25+0.25(4.01−1−αp) = 0. Changed domestic autonomous money demand elasticity of domestic prices γp
is derived from the readjustment condition xmD mDamD +xpp ˙amD = γxαmD−βxγp = 0.5·2.0025−0.25γp = 0.
Changed domestic autonomous price elasticity of domestic prices δp is derived from the readjustment
condition xppap + xmD mDap + xppȧp = −βxαp− γxβmD + βxδp = 0.25(δp− 4.01)− 0.5 · 2.0025 < 0, namely,
δp is minimally exceeded by 8.015.
4.5 State space. The discretised and parametrised dynamical system can therefore be vectorially
written as xt = µ+Axt−1 +Bεt, so that endogenous variable vector xt ∈ R
6×1 and x−1 be not contemplated,
drift intercept vector µ ∈ R6×1, companion matrix A ∈ R6×6 and exogenous shock matrix B ∈ R6×3.
Period zero’s impulse response function matrix to some exogenous shock is therefore x0 = Bε0, where
ε0 = σ is to rescale; consequently, the jth period impulse response function matrix to the same exogenous
shock is xj = A
jBε0 = A
jBσ.
In view of the above parametrisation below is a plot of domestic output x and domestic prices p impulse
response functions to exogenous shocks in domestic nominal money supply MS , domestic autonomous
money demand amD and domestic autonomous prices ap at a forty quarter period horizon.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions



































































Note. Impulse response functions of domestic output x and domestic prices p to 0.01 standard deviation shocks in domestic nominal
money supply MS , domestic autonomous money demand amD and domestic autonomous prices ap at a horizon of forty quarters.
Sovereignty and trade S ∧ T implosion is envisaged in all three cases: in the third case domestic output x implodes and in the first
two cases it explodes.
The impulse response functions envisage sovereignty and trade S ∧ T implosion in all cases: in the first
two cases domestic output x increases indefinitely and domestic prices p decrease indefinitely, until the upper
bound on inter-regional output x̃ at which autarky happens be reached; in the third case domestic output
x decreases indefinitely and domestic prices p increase indefinitely, until the lower bound on inter-regional
output x̃ at which autarky happens be reached.
4.6 Industrial revolution. The Gold standard preceded the Second industrial revolution and the
Second industrial revolution was such that England became the workshop of the world; shortly after there
began the Great divergence, whereby output growth in the West definitively overtook output growth in
the East. The inefficiency model justifies the advantage gained by English domestic output x through the
fixed superiority of domestic nominal money supply MS in the Gold standard or through the inferiority
in domestic prices p and the lasting rise in English domestic output x through endogeneity of domestic
prices p therein, all other domestic and foreign factors equal. In a word, it rationalises the rise of industry
and modern sustained growth as intra-regional growth, whereby one region technologically grows at the
stagnation or decline of the other, not as inter-regional growth, whereby a region technologically grows
irrespective of the others and all regions technologically grow together in potency: the first is a restatement
of mercantilistic growth, of long run demand sustainability, and the second a restatement of libertarian
growth, of long run supply sustainability, which are not mutually exclusive.
5. Federalism
Definition 5.1 (Transfers, output with transfers and inter-regional output) Domestic or foreign
transfers equal the arithmetic mean of output across the two regions minus domestic or foreign output,
respectively. Domestic or foreign output with transfers equals domestic or foreign output plus domestic
or foreign transfers, respectively. Inter-regional output equals domestic output with transfers plus foreign








x̂ = x + tr, x̂∗ = x∗ + tr∗;
x = x̂ + x̂∗ = x + tr + x∗ + tr∗ = x + x∗.
17
Domestic transfers tr are the difference between an average of domestic output x and of foreign output
x∗ and domestic output x. Foreign transfers tr∗ are the difference between an average of domestic output x
and of foreign output x∗ and foreign output x∗. Domestic output with transfers x̂ is the sum of domestic
output x and of domestic transfers tr. Foreign output with transfers x̂∗ is the sum of foreign output x∗
and of foreign transfers tr∗. Inter-regional output x is the sum of domestic output with transfers x̂ and of
foreign output with transfers x̂∗ : inter-regional output x is the sum of domestic output x and of foreign
output x∗, for tr + tr∗ = x+x
∗
2
− x + x+x
∗
2
− x∗ = 0.
5.2 Federalism and trade. The scope of transfers TR is to calculate an average of domestic and
foreign output x and x∗ in order to distribute it to each region in a fiscal union or confederation. Trade T
is to stop even under federalism F, nonetheless, because even though transfers TR may turn inter-regional
trade T into intra-regional trade T the implosion of sovereignty and trade S ∧ T continues at most until
the net importer have reached depletion of domestic labour l supply or capital k, barred access to domestic
savings sv or foreign credit, and at least until either region decide to stop trade T before.
In period t the net importer would finance domestic imports im through domestic external currency
ME exchanged for foreign external currency M
∗
E at domestic nominal exchange rate E, obtained back in
part for domestic exports ex : domestic external currency ME would have been either saved in period t− 1,
privately borrowed from the net exporter (at a risk premium) in period t or duly printed then. Indeed, in
the event the net importer did not export to the net exporter in period t the former would have to finance
domestic imports im in period t + 1 either through domestic external currency ME privately borrowed
from the net exporter or through domestic external currency ME saved in period t− 1 : in the absence of
either trade T would stop.




t until cessation: trade T stops whenever domestic capital k, supply of domestic labour l and domestic
savings sv have been depleted and whenever inter-regional credit be no longer available. Under trade T
domestic output x is an imperfect substitute of foreign output x∗ at the minimum and a perfect substitute
of foreign output x∗ at the maximum: such means that, net of foreign credit and savings sv, imports im are
financed only through exports ex and that under implosion of sovereignty and trade S ∧ T net importers
will ultimately stop importing, all else equal.
Federalism F can be fully understood as follows: a confederation is a fiscal union of nations; a nation is
a fiscal union of corporations; a corporation is a fiscal union of enterprises. Therefore, the Globalisation
paradox applies to nations as much as it may apply to corporations and it applies to corporations as much
as it may apply to enterprises, which means that corporations and enterprises can face sovereignty and
trade S ∧ T implosion as much as nations: if a nation features internal inefficient sovereign trade S ∧ T ∧ I
then its society faces a trade T imbalance.
5.3 Federalism or autarky. Given the feasible current account combinations, federalism F or autarky
A are inevitable. More clearly, any feasible current account combination featuring no trade T features
autarky A by definition; any feasible current account combination featuring inter-regional (i.e. external)
transfers TR features external federalism FE by definition; any feasible current account combination
featuring intra-regional (i.e. internal) transfers TR features internal federalism FI by definition, that is,
unitary regions, regardless of autarky A or external federalism FE . Thus, internal federalism FI and thereby
federalism F are ubiquitous; furthermore, if external federalism FE were present then federalism F would
be present all the more, with or without autarky A : S ∧A ∧E ⊢ FI and potentially FE ; S ∧ T ∧ I ⊢ FI
and potentially FE ; SB ∧ T ∧ E ⊢ FI and potentially FE ; SB ∧A ∧ E ⊢ FI and potentially FE . In other
words, all feasible current account combinations are internally federal and can additionally be externally
federal or autarkic.
The case of inefficient sovereign trade S ∧ T ∧ I is of interest because it is actual. Sovereignty and
trade S ∧ T implode and therefrom patently yield either of the following combinations. The first is efficient
sovereign autarky S ∧A∧E, which features autarky A and internal federalism FI , with or without external
federalism FE : S ∧ A ∧ E ⊢ FI and potentially FE such that (S ∧ A ∧ E)T R. The second is efficient
subjected trade SB ∧ T ∧ E, which features internal federalism FI , with or without external federalism
FE : SB∧T ∧E ⊢ FI and potentially FE such that (SB∧T ∧E)T R. The third is efficient subjected autarky
SB ∧ A ∧ E, which features autarky A and internal federalism FI , with or without external federalism
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FE : SB ∧A ∧ E ⊢ FI and potentially FE such that (SB ∧A ∧ E)T R. Before the implosion of sovereignty
and trade S ∧ T the two regions could already enter into a confederation, possibly diverting attention from
the said implosion, being there both internal and external federalism FI and FE : S ∧ T ∧ I ⊢ FI and
potentially FE such that (S ∧ T ∧ I)T R.
5.4 Historical combinations. Four feasible current account combinations stand out historically,
howbeit: autarkic mercantilism; the Gold standard; globalisation; world socialisation. Autarkic mercantilism
is efficient sovereign autarky S ∧ A ∧ E because autarky A and therefore efficiency E are embraced at
sovereignty S’s inter-regional disparity in the external real money market under closure C (e.g. Navigation
acts).
The Gold standard is inefficient sovereign trade S ∧T ∧ I because sovereignty S’s inter-regional disparity
in the external real money market and trade T without neutralisations cause an age of implosion, often
gradual, whereby there develops a philia for the net exporter (e.g. Second industrial revolution and English
workshop of the world, European monetary union and European Germanisation).
Globalisation is efficient subjected trade SB ∧ T ∧ E because the initial inefficient sovereign trade
S∧T ∧I, normally started by inter-regional disparity in external currencies and aggravated by inter-regional
disparity in autonomous prices, is downwardly nullified by neutralisation’s offsetting, eroding changes in
domestic autonomous prices ap (e.g. European monetary union and labour market precariat, Libertarianism
and golden straightjackets, 2000s USA and tariffs on Chinese imports). It could be argued that globalisation
could also theoretically promote upward nullifications of inter-regional disparities in the external real money
market, that is, offsetting, blossoming changes in inter-regional real money supply or money demand, not
eroding ones, but contemporary history permits one to record the phenomenon as thus described.
World socialisation is efficient subjected trade SB ∧ T ∧ E as well, absent the prevenient adoption of
inefficient sovereign trade S ∧ T ∧ I, because regions practise trade T at inter-regional parity in external
currency and proscribe almost all changes in inter-regional autonomous prices and autonomous money
demand, so that fiscal depreciations, inhuman working conditions, disproportionate territorial expansions,
tariffs and protectionistic measures may be conscientiously eluded and innovations in technology altogether
mutualised (equitably; more below), in a veritable socialisation of the world.
The most desirable combination after world socialisation is blatantly autarkic mercantilism, but game
theory is to ascertain so.
6. Nash equilibria
6.1 Players, strategies and payoffs. A non-cooperative static game is an n-uple composed of a set of
players, sets of player strategies and a player payoff function. In the present case the set of players has two
elements, which are domestic central bank CB and domestic treasury T : P = {CB, T}. Domestic central
bank CB’s strategy set contains Impossible trio combinations rigidity and openness R ∧O, rigidity and
independence R∧I and openness and independence O∧I, at positive disparity D+ or parity P in the external
real money market: SCB = {(R∧O)D+ , (R∧O)P , (R∧ I)D+ , (R∧ I)P , (O ∧ I)D+ , (O ∧ I)P }. Domestic
treasury T ’s strategy set contains Globalisation paradox combinations sovereignty and trade S∧T, sovereignty
and efficiency S∧E and trade and efficiency T ∧E, at no transfers NTR or transfers TR, in agreement with
the foreign region: ST = {(S∧T )NT R, (S∧T )T R, (S∧E)NT R, (S∧E)T R, (T ∧E)NT R, (T ∧E)T R}. The
strategy profile set is the product of the player strategy sets: (sCB , sT ) ∈ (SCB × ST ). The player payoff
function is a bijection of the strategy profile set into the real number set or line: πP : (SCB × ST )→ R.
The game is thus the triple G = {P, Sp, πP }.
6.2 Information. In game theory: symmetric information means that payoffs are not subjective;
certain information means that player types do not change; complete information means that player types
are known to all players; imperfect information means that players cannot observe other player actions.
Static games are imperfect information games, because they are simultaneous. One has not specified player
types; the game one has constructed consequently presents asymmetric, certain, complete and imperfect
information.
6.3 Game equilibria. John Nash [10] used the Kakutani fixed point theorem to prove that every
game with finite players and mixed strategies presents an equilibrium. Mixed strategies are continuous
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probability assignments to pure strategies (i.e. randomisations) and pure strategy games are mixed strategy
games in which particular pure strategies are chosen with a probability of one.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that its player payoff features a player’s best strategy
given the other players’ best strategies: (s∗p, s
∗




¬p) ≥ π(sp, s
∗
¬p). A best response
function is a bijection of the other players’ strategy set into a player’s strategy set such that a player’s
strategy is the best strategy given the other players’ strategies: ρp : S¬p → Sp such that s
∗
p = ρp(s¬p). If a





p = ρp(s¬p) and s
∗
¬p = ρ¬p(sp), for a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile by the reciprocal
best responses.
6.4 Central bank payoffs. One gives rise to domestic central bank CB payoffs as follows. Domestic
central bank CB prefers such strategies in a decreasing order: rigidity and independence at parity (R∧ I)P ;
openness and independence at parity (O ∧ I)P ; openness and independence at positive disparity (O ∧ I)D+ ;
rigidity and independence at positive disparity (R∧ I)D+ ; rigidity and openness at parity (R∧O)P ; rigidity
and openness at positive disparity (R ∧O)D+ .
It firstly prefers rigidity and independence R ∧ I to openness and independence O ∧ I under parity P
because it desires to inhibit gains in competitiveness through fixed parity in external currency. It then
prefers openness and independence O ∧ I to rigidity and independence R ∧ I at positive disparity D+
because it desires to eliminate gains in competitiveness, only through flexible disparity in external currency,
since flexible parity in external currency has already been ranked. It finally prefers rigidity and openness
R ∧ O under parity P to rigidity and openness R ∧ O under positive disparity D+ because it desires to
export monetary policy without gains in competitiveness.
Overall, domestic central bank CB prefers to avoid and to eliminate gains in competitiveness to
exporting monetary policy. Such implies the cardinal transformation (R ∧ I)P ≻ (O ∧ I)P ≻ (O ∧ I)D+ ≻
(R ∧ I)D+ ≻ (R ∧O)P ≻ (R ∧O)D+ 7→ 6 > 5 > 4 > 3 > 2 > 1.
6.5 Treasury payoffs. One gives rise to domestic treasury T payoffs as follows. Under parity P
sovereignty and trade S ∧ T and sovereignty and efficiency S ∧E are excluded and under positive disparity
D+ trade and efficiency T ∧ E is excluded, thus, domestic treasury T cannot thereby interact.
Under positive disparity D+ domestic treasury T prefers such strategies in a decreasing order: sovereignty
and efficiency at no transfers (S∧E)NT R; sovereignty and efficiency at transfers (S∧E)T R; sovereignty and
trade at transfers (S ∧ T )T R; sovereignty and trade at no transfers (S ∧ T )NT R. It first prefers sovereignty
and efficiency at no transfers (S ∧ E)NT R to sovereignty and efficiency at transfers (S ∧ E)T R because it
desires to protect domestic enterprises from sovereignty and trade S ∧ T without a fiscal union. It then
prefers sovereignty and trade at transfers (S ∧ T )T R to sovereignty and trade at no transfers (S ∧ T )NT R
because it desires to mitigate sovereignty and trade S ∧ T implosion through a fiscal union. Such implies
the cardinal transformation (S ∧ E)NT R ≻ (S ∧ E)T R ≻ (S ∧ T )T R ≻ (S ∧ T )NT R 7→ 4 > 3 > 2 > 1.
Under parity P domestic treasury T prefers such strategies in a decreasing order: trade and efficiency
at no transfers (T ∧ E)NT R; trade and efficiency at transfers (T ∧ E)T R. It prefers trade and efficiency at
no transfers (T ∧ E)NT R to trade and efficiency at transfers (T ∧ E)T R because it desires to avoid a fiscal
union. Such implies the cardinal transformation (T ∧ E)NT R ≻ (T ∧ E)T R 7→ 2 > 1.
Proposition 6.6 (Pure strategy Nash equilibria) The game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria:
rigidity and independence at parity and trade and efficiency at no transfers ((R∧I)P , (T ∧E)NT R); openness
and independence at positive disparity and sovereignty and efficiency at no transfers ((O∧I)D+ , (S∧E)NT R).
Proof. Domestic central bank CB’s best responses are the following. If domestic treasury T selects
sovereignty and trade S ∧ T or sovereignty and efficiency S ∧ E at no transfers NTR or transfers TR then
domestic central bank CB responds with openness and independence O∧ I at positive disparity D+ : sT =
(S ∧ T )NT R, (S ∧ T )T R, (S ∧E)NT R, (S ∧E)T R −→ ρCB(sT ) = (O ∧ I)D+ . If domestic treasury T selects
trade and efficiency T ∧E at no transfers NTR or transfers TR then domestic central bank CB responds
with rigidity and independence R∧ I at parity P : sT = (T ∧E)NT R, (T ∧E)T R −→ ρCB(sT ) = (R∧ I)P .
Domestic treasury T ’s best responses are the following. If domestic central bank CB selects rigidity
and openness R ∧ O, rigidity and independence R ∧ I or openness and independence O ∧ I at positive
disparity D+ then domestic treasury T responds with sovereignty and efficiency S ∧ E at no transfers
NTR : sCB = (R ∧ O)D+ , (R ∧ I)D+ , (O ∧ I)D+ −→ ρT (sCB) = (S ∧ E)NT R. If domestic central bank
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CB selects rigidity and openness R ∧O, rigidity and independence R ∧ I or openness and independence
O ∧ I at parity P then domestic treasury T responds with trade and efficiency T ∧ E at no transfers
NTR : sCB = (R ∧O)P , (R ∧ I)P , (O ∧ I)P −→ ρT (sCB) = (T ∧ E)NT R.
The intersection of the best responses is strategy profile: rigidity and independence at parity and trade
and efficiency at no transfers ((R ∧ I)P , (T ∧ E)NT R); openness and independence at positive disparity
and sovereignty and efficiency at no transfers ((O ∧ I)D+ , (S ∧ E)NT R). QED
Table 1: Mercantile dilemma
Central bank Treasury
S ∧ T S ∧ E T ∧ E





United states of America
(1, 2)
(1, 4) (1, 3)
P (2, 2)


























Note. The Mercantile dilemma arises from the intersection of the capital and current account trichotomy, that is, of Mundell’s and
Rodrik’s trilemma (i.e. the Impossible trio and the Globalisation paradox). For domestic central bank CB combination: R ∧ O
is rigidity and openness; R ∧ I is rigidity and independence; O ∧ I is openness and independence; D+ is positive disparity and
P is parity in the external real money market. For domestic treasury T combination: S ∧ T is sovereignty and trade; S ∧ E is
sovereignty and efficiency; T ∧ E is trade and efficiency; NT R are no transfers and T R are transfers. Feasible player payoffs are
in round brackets; historical cases of certain strategy profiles are displayed. Strategy profile ((R ∧ O)D+ , (S ∧ T )NT R) is also the
European monetary union and dollarisation; strategy profile ((R ∧ I)D+ , (S ∧ T )NT R) is also contemporary China; strategy profiles
((R ∧ O)P , (T ∧ E)NT R) and ((O ∧ I)P , (T ∧ E)NT R) are autonomous international clearing unions, in growth, or globalisation, in
decline; all strategy profiles presenting (O ∧ I)D+ admit reserve currency acquisitions (for under rigidity at positive disparity RD+
the peg prohibits them); all strategy profiles presenting rigidity R admit managed floats or currency substitutions. The pure strategy
Nash equilibria are the Artificial currency area and Modern protectionism.
6.7 International clearing union. In 1944 John Keynes [5] advocated the creation of the International
clearing union and of the Bancor currency: the Bancor currency would have been the currency in which
all international trade T would have been conducted and flexible external currencies under openness and
independence O ∧ I would have fluctuated against the Bancor; the International clearing union would have
transferred the balance of payment excesses from the net exporters to the net importers in de facto fiscal
unions, through transfers TR. Keynes’ International clearing union would have moreover forced external
currency realignments, in managed floats, under rigidity and openness R ∧O; it would have thus reached
efficiency E through trade and subjection T ∧ SB.
In terms of the game one constructed Keynes’ proposal without forced realignments in external currency
is strategy profile openness and independence at positive disparity and sovereignty and trade at transfers
((O ∧ I)D+ , (S ∧ T )T R) and Keynes’ proposal with forced realignments in external currency is strategy
profile rigidity and openness at parity and trade and efficiency at transfers ((R ∧O)P , (T ∧ E)T R), which
were both rejected.
6.8 World socialisation and autarkic mercantilism. Keynes’ full proposal was a form of ex post
clearance; the Nash equilibrium rigidity and independence at parity and trade and efficiency at no transfers
((R ∧ I)P , (T ∧ E)NT R) is a form of ex ante clearance, because it anticipates the balance of payment
mismatches through fixed parity in external currencies, by means of inter-regional external real money
market equality and technology communism (suitably covering the opportunity costs of research and
development, conducted centrally, in principle), under rigidity R, independence I trade T and efficiency E,
without a fiscal union: world socialisation, a most optimal currency area.
The Nash equilibrium openness and independence at positive disparity and sovereignty and efficiency at
no transfers ((O ∧ I)D+ , (S ∧E)NT R) finally shows that autarkic mercantilism is a second best to world
socialisation, whereby the balance of payment mismatches leading to sovereignty and trade S ∧ T implosion
are avoided through trade T curtailment.
The Mercantile dilemma is therefore the dichotomy between the two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
artificial currency areas and modern protectionism, excluding globalisation indeed.
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7. Literature critique
7.1 Inconsistent quartet. Before closing five remarks are in order. Firstly, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa’s
[11] Inconsistent quartet is Mundell’s trilemma (i.e. Impossible trio) augmented to include trade T : it
is imprecise because if trade T is excluded then two categories out of the capital account trichotomy can
at most be selected, not three (as the epithet by contrast suggests); furthermore, trade T can be selected
alongside any two categories of the capital account trichotomy, because trade T pertains to the current
account trichotomy, that is, Rodrik’s trilemma (i.e. Globalisation paradox), which intersects Mundell’s
trilemma to a deeper extent.
7.2 Quadrilemma. Secondly, Joshua Aizenman’s [1] Quadrilemma is the extension of Mundell’s
trilemma to reserve currency acquisitions: it is imprecise because the accumulation of reserve currency,
which is the opposite of currency substitution, can happen both under financial openness and monetary
policy independence (i.e. openness and independence O ∧ I) and under fixed exchange rates and monetary
policy independence (i.e. rigidity and independence R ∧ I) with a double currency and external OMOs,
that is, fully within Mundell’s trilemma.
It can also happen under any other closure combination (i.e. C ∧ D ∧ F, C ∧ I ∧ F, C ∧ D ∧ R):
under combinations C ∧D ∧ F and C ∧ I ∧ F reserve currency can be accumulated through OMOs; under
combination C ∧D ∧R reserve currency can be indirectly accumulated through OMOs whilst preserving
rigidity R’s peg (i.e. nullifying potential revaluations), otherwise abandoning it.
7.3 Dilemma. To Hélène Rey [14], thirdly, monetary policy independence is a necessary and sufficient
condition for financial closure, given fixed or floating exchange rates. The reason she conveys is that
financial openness contemporarily triggers private or public debt crises, so that monetary policy yield
to debt crises corrections, to the detriment of other closed or open economy anti-cyclical interventions,
seemingly losing monetary policy independence.
One objects that such is altogether inconsistent on the part of necessity (i.e. monetary policy dependence
need not imply financial openness, as combinations C ∧D ∧ F and C ∧D ∧R bear out) and specious on
the part of sufficiency, owing to a semantic blunder, for Mundell’s monetary policy independence amidst
financial openness is in relation to exchange rate floatation or fixation, not other anti-cyclical interventions:
the question is “Can one do it?”, not “What can one do?”, it is “Can one make use of monetary policy at
all?”, not “What is most constraining one’s use of anti-cyclical monetary policy?”; Mundell’s issue is a
normative one, whilst Rey treats of the positive.
In practice, if the exchange rate is fixed the peg is then abandoned in order to correct the debt crisis
and if it is floating correction is then all the more immediate, in financial openness and monetary policy
independence either way. The punchline is that monetary policy independence and financial openness are
still sufficient for exchange rate floatation and Mundell’s trilemma is especially applied.
7.4 National democracy. Palley [12] fourthly describes Rodrik’s trilemma as analytically erroneous,
for globalisation is not incompatible with national democracy, he highlights, for many a democracy have
partaken in globalisation to this day, XIX century golden straightjacket United kingdom included, and so
have autocracies, as contemporary Singapore, he continues; that which Rodrik on the other hand assumes
is consequently flawed: globalisation is excluded by national policies and democracy is not a residual -
incorrect, says Palley.
Yet, could Rodrik’s scrutiny of the contemplated issues have actually been deeper? Could Palley
himself not have fully understood Rodrik after all? Incidentally, Palley does stress the power of language
in economics, but struggles to rigorously frame his usage of the categories “globalisation” and “national
democracy” in Rodrik’s trilemma, against whose categories his criticism is ultimately raised; tangentially,
Palley also fails to represent the Impossible trio, presenting it as a trilemma between floating exchange
rates, financial openness and monetary policy independence, the first category thereof being truly fixed
exchange rates.
Palley appears to understand Rodrik’s deep economic integration, herewith formalised as trade T, as
globalisation and national democracy as Rodrik’s nation state and democratic politics at once, respectively
formalised as sovereignty S and efficiency E herewith; as a result, in terms of the present formalisation of
the Globalisation paradox, he deduces a compromise between trade T on the one hand and sovereignty
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and efficiency S ∧ E on the other, thereby actually confirming Rodrik’s theorisation whereby the latter
two exclude the former in autarky A (i.e. national democracy does exclude globalisation, according to
Palley’s own comprehension of the Globalisation paradox), being there moreover a dichotomy involving
globalisation, as opposed to a trichotomy, inasmuch as Rodrik’s nation state and democratic politics be
conflated by Palley himself into national democracy, misconstruing Rodrik’s articulation and conclusions.
In Rodrik’s trichotomy globalisation is instead the combination (a side, not an angle) of trade and
efficiency T ∧ E (i.e. global federalism) in subjection SB (i.e. no nation state), as hereby formalised,
whereby the autonomy in giving rise to disparities in the external real money market is forgone towards
the inter-regional objective of preserving exchange and equal growth as a (pejorative) result of sovereignty
and trade S ∧ T (i.e. golden straightjacket) implosion, not to begin with in the aspired progress of world
socialisation. Rodrik’s insight is therefore merely such: globalisation, that is, global federalism (i.e. deep
economic integration and democratic politics), is incompatible with nation states, not national democracies.
7.5 Macro-foundations. Fifthly, 1970s, old macro-econometrics was flawed not because implicitly
optimising or not rationally expecting, but because estimating parameters for policy analysis, as opposed
to axiomatically calibrating them: the only message of the Lucas critique is that policy robust models are
time independent, that parameters cannot be thus determined by the data, but by axioms, and that the
data account for forecasting at a given policy. Therefore, because axiomatic foundations are not limited to
optimisation problems with rational expectations, macro-foundations as hereby employed feature legitimacy.
Indeed, the present macro-foundations relinquish the modelling system of equation triplets for supply,
demand and market clearing with regard to commodities in favour of the direct approach of one equation per
variable, whereby each equation captures the dynamics of all variables on implicit account of the canonical
law of supply and demand (i.e. respectively increasing and decreasing in prices). Now, the Sonnenschein
Mantel Debreu or “Anything goes” theorem articulates that the excess agent demands of individual markets
(e.g. output, money, labour, capital) aggregate into many excess demands for the given market, preserving
the sole properties of continuity, homogeneity of degree zero and market clearing: at heart, it conveys
that if the canonical law of supply and demand stems from microeconomic constituents then it need not
apply to the macroeconomy, especially if modelled by means of representative agents (i.e. households, firms,
intermediaries, government). By considering the economy as a whole and directly applying the canonical
law of supply and demand to it, thereby ignoring its underlying components, the present macro-foundations
are immune to the theorem, unlike optimisation problems with rational expectations of representative
agents.
Lastly, statistical significance is no more than a sufficient condition for theoretical model validation,
that is, it is certainly unnecessary, because of misspecification, and the ultimate validation theoretical
models must receive from micro-econometrics is that from data statistics, not regression analysis. Potential
criticisms therefrom are therefore likewise wanting in definitiveness.
7.6 Extensions. In the sixth place, section 4 did not model domestic autonomous prices ap and
domestic autonomous money demand amD, by means of wages, capital return, technology, output demand
and taxation, because of modelling parsimony: the model’s complexity is to augment in the research
questions number and the results of its preceding versions must remain unvaried. In future work the
external sector should explicitly present domestic autonomous prices ap and domestic autonomous money
demand amD as well as domestic real rates of interest r, expected interest er and exchange e; future work
should moreover envision the internal sector, modelled in accord with a corporativistic outlook, by which
firms give rise to guilds and guilds give rise to polities via fiscal unions, both similarly segmented into
tradable and non-tradable sectors.
8. Conclusion
8.1 Trilemmas and implosion. The present study has formalised Mundell’s Impossible trio and
Rodrik’s Globalisation paradox. In Mundell’s trilemma a region cannot simultaneously fix its real exchange
rate, identify it as a function of domestic and foreign external real money supply and money demand and
maintain its internal nominal money supply floating. In Rodrik’s trilemma a region cannot simultaneously
discriminate its external real money supply and money demand from their foreign counterparts, maintain
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its external output as a function of domestic and foreign real money supply and money demand and identify
it with foreign external output.
By means of Kaldor’s price endogeneity in output (i.e. long run demand sustainability) the present
study has then shown that in the framework of Rodrik’s trilemma external real money market disparity
and trade generate inter-regional external output mismatches, which unless neutralised by changes in the
inter-regional external real money market ultimately dismantle trade.
8.2 Federalism and Nash equilibria. One has thirdly defined transfers such that confederations are
the sums of inter-regional external outputs achieved via transfers, demonstrating that all unitary regions are
federal and that all regions can form a confederation, regardless of the trade between them: by extension,
one has upheld corporativism, for one has demonstrated that polities are fiscal unions of guilds and that
guilds are fiscal unions of firms and that the ultimate bout of sovereignty and trade implosion is at the firm
level, speaking to Marc Mélitz’s [8] new new trade theory.
According to Thirlwall [17], Kaldor attributed price decrease and convexity in output to the manufac-
turing sector, consequently, firms (and thereby guilds and polities) specialising in the secondary sector
should be the ones to benefit from the inefficiency advantage of the Rodrik trilemma, eclipsing the primary
and tertiary sectors until trade cessation or neutralisation. Indeed, one has also proven that the said
inter-regional external output mismatches can be offset only through autarky or changes in the inter-regional
external real money market.
One has finally derived two Nash equilibria, corresponding to an artificial currency union guaranteeing
efficiency in the face of trade and to autarky in the presence of flexible disparity in external currency.
8.3 Historical relevance. In the process one believes to have historically borne out the following
causal relationships: 1600s Dutch foreign competitiveness and the English Navigation acts (see Israel
[3]); the Gold standard, the Second industrial revolution and the Great divergence (see Bordo and James
[2]); South Korea’s rise and Japan’s lost trentennium; the 1990s Argentinian dollarisation and crisis; the
European monetary union, European Germanisation and European precariat, German included (see Meade
[7]); the 2000s Dollar Yuan fixation, the imperial American trade deficit and the resurgence of (American)
protectionism.
More broadly, one believes the present study to have rationalised the deindustrialisation of the United
kingdom, of Western Europe, of Japan and of North America to the gain of the East and the frenzy of
libertarianism, the golden straightjacket and globalisation.
In line with Keynes’ International clearing union and Bancor proposal, one is lastly convinced of
having re-established the following three tenets: external real money supply or money demand disparity
together with price endogeneity in output supplants the theory of comparative advantages, speaking to Paul
Krugman’s [6] new trade theory (see Thirlwall [16]); long run economic growth is not only determined by
productivity and technology shocks, but also by demand for external output and a ratio weakly greater than





(see Serra [15]), not globalisation, is the best alternative to world socialisation.
In a word, the demonisation of the revived autarkic waves seems to precisely characterise the sentinel of
globalisation’s actual intent: real wages compression and living standards erosion of developed nations.
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Appendix
Such is the Julia code generating the impulse response functions graph.
1 using LinearAlgebra, Statistics, Plots
2


















21 #State equation matrices
22 P=[1 −gamma_x beta_x −alpha_x 0 0;
23 0 1 0 0 −alpha_md beta_md;
24 0 0 1 0 0 −alpha_p;
25 0 0 0 1 0 0;
26 0 0 0 0 1 0;
27 0 0 0 0 0 1];
28 Q=[zeros(2, 6);
29 −epsilon_p 0 0 beta_p gamma_p −∆_p;
30 0 0 0 1 0 0;
31 0 0 0 0 1 0;
32 0 0 0 0 0 1];
33 R=[zeros(3, 3);
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34 sigma_MS 0 0;
35 0 sigma_amd 0;





41 #System instability check
42 evalA, evecA=eigen(A);
43 if (any(abs.(evalA).>1))
44 println("The system is unstable");
45 else #(any(abs.(evalA).≤1))
46 println("The system is not unstable");
47 end
48






55 #a)nominal money supply
56 Xirf_nms[:, 1]=B[:, 1]*sigma_MS;
57 for j=2:H
58 Xirf_nms[:, j]=A*Xirf_nms[:, j−1];
59 end
60
61 #b)autonomous money demand
62 Xirf_amd[:, 1]=B[:, 2]*sigma_amd;
63 for j=2:H




68 Xirf_ap[:, 1]=B[:, 3]*sigma_ap;
69 for j=2:H







77 p1=plot(t, 10^(5)*Xirf_nms[1, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Ouput", label=false, ...
grid=false);
78 p2=plot(t, 10^(5)*Xirf_nms[3, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Prices", label=false, ...
grid=false);
79 p1s=plot(p1, p2, layout=(1, 2), title="NMS shock");
80
81 p3=plot(t, 10^(4)*Xirf_amd[1, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Ouput", label=false, ...
grid=false);
82 p4=plot(t, 10^(5)*Xirf_amd[3, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Prices", label=false, ...
grid=false);
83 p2s=plot(p3, p4, layout=(1, 2), title="AMD shock");
84
85 p5=plot(t, 10^(4)*Xirf_ap[1, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Ouput", label=false, ...
grid=false);
86 p6=plot(t, 10^(4)*Xirf_ap[3, :], xlabel="Quarters", ylabel="Prices", label=false, ...
grid=false);
87 p3s=plot(p5, p6, layout=(1, 2), title="AP shock");
88
89 plot(p1s, p2s, p3s, layout=(3, 1))
90 savefig("IRFs.eps")
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